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Nordic peace
? Another dimension of Nordic exceptionalism?
When ?Nordic exceptionalism? is discussed, the emphasis is usually on how
our societies are constructed, e.g. whether the welfare state was invented by
Swedish Social Democrats or by Bismarck. I would like to suggest that the
relations among our societies, and in particular the peace, deserve equal attention.
Let me begin with our record in different time perspectives. During the five
centuries culminating in the Napoleonic wars we had 60 wars: within our
states, between our states and with our neighbours. Yet in the 20th century
the Finnish revolution was the only war inside our states; wars with our
neighbours were limited to Germany attacking Denmark and Norway in 1940
and the Soviet Union Finland in 1939 (plus Finland joining Germany against
the Soviet Union in 1941); and there was not a single case where we were even
close to a war with each other. Something had happened.
Our glorious non-wars: the record
Our pacific relations were not for lack of conflicts. In several cases, we had
conflicts about things that tend to be highly explosive: autonomy, secession,
territory, language. The main non-wars in the 20th century were:
f Norway seceded from Sweden in 1905 by a unilateral declaration of independence.
While there was some rattling of Swedish sabres, the predominant political
forces in both countries were against the use of military means, and the secession
was eventually formally recognized by Sweden after a couple of months of
negotiation resulting in the Treaty of Karlstad in August 1905.
f When Finland became independent in 1918, the issue arose what to do with
the Aaland Islands, which had become permanently demilitarized by an
international treaty after the Crimean War. Their (almost entirely Swedish)
population arranged a referendum by petition, where more than 90 per cent
opted to join Sweden rather than Finland. The two states agreed to refer their
dispute to the League of Nations, who passed it on to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration (the predecessor to the International Court of Justice). The Court,
having heard their historical, geological, constitutional, etc. arguments,
awarded sovereignty over the islands to Finland, but the award also contained
a number of guarantees for the continued Swedish-ness of the islands in terms
of language, criteria for local citizenship, land-owning, and so forth. The
Aaland Islands population is the largest one to have had its fate decided by
arbitration by an international court after a dispute between two states.
f The status of Svalbard (Spitzbergen) was settled by an international treaty in
1920 where Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago was recognized, all
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other signatories obtained the right to exploit natural resources there (now
only exercised by Russia) and it was made permanently and completely
demilitarized.
f The Permanent Court of Arbitration had Scandinavia on its agenda once more
a  decade  later,  when  Denmark  and  Norway  were  in  a  dispute  about  the
sovereignty over some 100,000 square miles in Eastern Greenland. The Court
decided in favour of Denmark, making this the largest land area to be ruled on
by an international court after a dispute between two states.
f Iceland?s independence resulted from peaceful negotiations concluded by a
treaty in 1918. Iceland?s unilateral severing of the remaining formal ties with
Denmark in 1944 was completely in accordance with this treaty, the only
Danish objection being that it would have been nicer of the Icelanders to have
waited until Denmark itself had been liberated from the German occupation
(and Iceland from British occupation).
f In 1946, a referendum was arranged by the population of the Faroe Islands, although
there was no constitutional provision for it. There was a scant majority for
independence from Denmark, but the Faroese elections later in the year gave
slightly less than half of the seats in the Faroese parliament to pro-
independence parties, and the issue was eventually settled by a compromise
on home rule.
f Greenland?s status changed in 1950 from that of a colony to becoming a part of
the Danish realm, Denmark being sensitive about the UN rules for annual
reports on colonies. Greenland, or Kalaalit Nunaat, eventually got its home
rule in 1979 and quickly left the EC (which the Faroe Islands never joined).
Apart from these major conflicts, recent decades have also seen a long series
of conflicts about economic zones, fishing rights etc. between several of the
Scandinavian states and dependencies, as well as with some neighbours,
Iceland?s ?Cod War? with the UK being the legendary case. Several conflicts
were settled by arbitration (Norway vs. Denmark over Jan Mayen) or negotiations
(Norway vs. Iceland and Sweden vs. USSR); concerning the rest (including
Norway vs. USSR/Russia) there are agreements on how to behave until the
issue is settled.
In the 1980s, Sweden and Denmark had a dispute about oil drilling rights
close to the Danish island Hesselø in the waters between them, both govern-
ments using a heated language. The opposition leaders in both countries stated
(and were quoted in the neighbouring country) that their own governments
were too clumsy and inflexible in the conflict. The compromise that was soon
reached acknowledged Denmark?s claim to an economic zone around the island,
Sweden gained fishing rights in a strip of the Baltic Sea as a consolation.
We may add a domestic case: the repeated manifestations of a language conflict
in Finland. After the Russian takeover in 1809, Swedish remained the sole
administrative language in spite of the Swedish minority steadily dwindling
from its initial 25 per cent; Finnish was then given an equal position by the
mid-century, and an attempt in the 1890s to introduce the Russian language
was defeated by civilian resistance. When the issue reemerged after the
crushed revolution, there were many who had heated feelings about it; but it
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resulted in a compromise where very few states in the world can match
Finland?s generosity to what is now a minority of 6 per cent with Swedish as
mother tongue.
This series of ?glorious non-wars? is impressive. Peaceful secession from a
neighbouring state, with no connection to war, is a rare phenomenon; before
the 1990s, the only parallels to the Norwegian secession in 1905 were
Singapore leaving Malaysia in 1963 (actually invited to do so) two years after
Great Britain had federated them when leaving, and the dissolution of the
United Arab Republic after a few years of marriage between Egypt and Syria.
All these Nordic cases of arbitration and agreement by negotiation have also
turned out to be long term successes: the conflict issues were never reopened.
(The long-standing dispute between Norway and some major signatories to
the Svalbard Treaty does not question the Treaty itself, but is rather about
how to interpret its application and extrapolation to the economic zone around
the archipelago so as to reconcile Norwegian sovereignty with the rights of
the signatories to exploit natural resources.)
Some non-explanations
So what happened in between and how could ? and did ? it happen? If we use
the terms of Karl Deutsch1, who used the Nordic countries as an early example,
a ?security community? had been created. Yet there is something that does not
quite fit. Deutsch?s paradigm was reintroduced and revised a few years ago by
Adler and Barnett2 but they keep some of his basic assumptions: that security
communities are created around one dominant state and that they evolve from
military alliances based on common threats or economic alliances for mutual
benefit.
NATO or the EU might be adduced as examples of this; the Nordic area is not
a good one. Each Nordic state always saw some external threat, but the location
of the threat sometimes changed, and it was never common before the Cold
War, which was, from this point of view, a couple of generations too late to
serve as an explanation. The most drastic division was in the early 1940s,
when Finland was ?brother-at-arms? with Germany, which kept Denmark
and Norway occupied. And to the extent a common threat is defined during
the Cold War, it is not a specific state or alliance, but is seen rather at a more
abstract level, where the threat is seen as lying in an increased tension in the
Nordic area and its surroundings and the remedy lies in attempts to coordinate
measures to keep the tension down ? the so called Nordic balance.
Thus the Nordic community was not built up around any form of military
cooperation; from that point of view, the Nordic area is a continuous
?failure?. Denmark?s two wars about Schleswig-Holstein (in 1849?1852 and
1863?1864) attracted thousands of Swedish and Norwegian volunteers, but
when Charles XV had promised the Danish king to take Sweden into the war,
his own government said ?No? in 1863. Ideas of a defence union with Finland
were promoted by political actors in Sweden in 1938?1939, including the
1 Deutch et al. 1957.
2 Adler & Barnett
1998.
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Social Democrat foreign minister, but were rejected by the government. After
the Soviet attack on Finland in November 1939, it went no further than
declaring Sweden non-belligerent (rather than neutral), thus being able to
give or lend Finland great amounts of military equipment and permit many
thousand Swedish volunteers to join Finland?s forces. It would not (and nor
would Norway) permit British-French military assistance to Finland through
its own territory in early 1940, but ? as a once-only exception ? granted the
transition of a German division from Norway to Finland in 1941. Discussions
about a Danish-Norwegian-Swedish neutrality defence union appeared in
the 1920s and early1930s; when the security environment gradually worsened,
they petered out, and in 1937 the Danish Premier Stauning wrote them off,
stating that Denmark did not want the role of watch dog. In 1945, Denmark,
Norway and Sweden were all back to, or still ran, their prewar policies of
isolated neutrality, and in 1948?1949 they had negotiations on a neutrality
defence union. This failed, however, much due to the Atlanticist wing in the
Norwegian Labour party, to whom such a union was only of interest if being a
first step towards what became NATO. Denmark then failed to interest
Sweden in a bilateral defence union between them and finally followed
Norway in opting for NATO (as did Iceland).  Sweden keeping its ?non-
alignment in peace aiming at neutrality in war? (NATO membership rapidly
became a non-issue) and Finland concluding its Friendship, Cooperation and
Mutual Aid Agreement with the USSR in 1948, the Nordic area was now
more split than ever in terms of military arrangements. To the extent any
cooperation has occurred, it has either been top secret (such as Sweden?s
coordination with NATO via Norway) or quite informal and based on all
countries taking each other?s security concerns into account in their own
policies and having a joint interest in keeping the strategic importance of, and
tensions in, the Nordic area and surrounding waters as low as possible. The
?Nordic balance? may best be described as a balance of latent possibilities.
The creation of the Danish-German Baltic Approaches Command in 1961 was
seen as a threat by the USSR, which asked for consultations with Finland in
accordance with their Agreement. Norway then hinted that closer coordination
between Finland and the USSR might lead to a revision of the Norwegian
policy on foreign bases, after which President Urho Kekkonen persuaded
Premier Nikita Chrushchev not to press the call for consultations.
Nor can our community be said to be built around any institutions for economic
cooperation. The most that was achieved in the early phases was a customs
union between Sweden and Norway, and that was dissolved in 1896. Repeated
negotiations about a free trade area or a Nordic Economic Zone in the post-
WWII period failed. The reasons seem to be parallel  to the failure of all
military grand plans: the five Nordic countries simply did no have sufficient
common interests and were looking in different directions both in terms of
main threats and attractive major partners ? in addition, some saw the grand
plans as an end in themselves or as a substitute for joining bigger military or
economic arrangements; others saw regional plans as a first step to joining the
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bigger ones. All joined EFTA in 1960, when there seemed to be a choice to
make between Great Britain and continental Europe. Once this changed
with the British entering the EC, Denmark quickly joined them (the Faroe
Islands did not, however, and Greenland soon left the EC after gaining home
rule in 1979), but no other Nordic country did. In the next round by the mid-
1990s, the Nordic division remained, but the pattern was changed by Finland
and Sweden joining, while Norway and Iceland stayed out.
Norden remains anomalous even if we look at it in terms of trade, rather than
institutional arrangements. It was only after the creation of the community
that trade among us started to grow beyond the traditional circa 10 per cent
the other Nordic countries together took of each country?s trade. After a rapid
growth during World War I, it sank to a somewhat higher level, and the same
thing repeated itself during and after World War II, the eventual level
? after a further growth period beginning around 1960 ? growing to 20?25
per cent, which to each state made the other Nordic countries taken together
more important than any other single trade partner. And in the 1970s and
1980s, the relative development of their trade with each other and with the
EC for a long time showed little relation with who joined the EC and who did
not. Furthermore, the higher level of trade has not led to a higher degree of
political integration, at least not if that is taken to mean the creation of
supranational bodies that can oblige member states. Neither the Nordic
Council (parliamentarians) from 1953, nor the Nordic Council of Ministers
from 1970 have that character, and there is no Nordic court.
Furthermore, it is difficult to see the Nordic security community as built
around a core state. Throughout the post-Napoleonic period, Sweden?s main
claim to being a core state would lie in being the militarily strongest state;
but that does not seem relevant. During the formative nineteenth century of
the Nordic security community, it was clearly Denmark that was the richest
state in terms of GDP per capita, even getting a considerable Swedish labour
immigration; it was only a little into the twentieth century that Sweden took
over that position, recently losing it again. In terms of political development,
finally, it is rather Norway that is pioneering, introducing parliamentarianism
a generation before it was firmly established in Denmark and Sweden around
1920; and Finland was first with universal (including female) franchise in
1906. True, Sweden has sometimes tried to play a leading role, but this has
often been self-defeating, making the others see it as ?too big for its boots?.
Having great powers as neighbours, the Nordic area was indeed affected by
Realpolitik during the two last centuries, and it may also have contributed to a
few of the non-wars. Great Britain disapproved of the Danish position in 1863
and provided no support. It also made it clear that it would disapprove of a war
in 1905. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, Sweden and Finland
would have incurred high political costs by entering a war over the Aaland
Islands. But it is hard to see Realpolitik as any significant factor in explaining
the genesis of the Nordic community in the 19th century. If anything, it did so
Nordic peace
213A
in a negative way: it probably made the genesis easier as after the Napoleonic
wars we were an area of rather low strategic interest until Atlantic naval
strategies ? and later nuclear strategies ? increased it in the 20th century.
And during the Cold War, where there was a common (although informally
so) Realpolitik of our states, it consisted precisely of trying to reduce the
Realpolitik effects of the Cold War on our area.
?and some explanations
The Nordic development does not solely offer anomalies in relation to the
Deutsch framework and its later emendations. Where the framework fits
better, this mainly has to do with the central role Deutsch gives to communication
? and with cognitive and normative developments. Migration made citizens
from another Nordic country the biggest (or even two biggest) group(s) of
non-citizens in each Nordic countries, and each country has a sizable group of
its  own citizens  with  more  than superficial  knowledge  of  other  Nordic
countries through having returned from them. Language and religion made
communication easier, inter alia by providing for a common construction of
meanings and values. There is much of a language community, albeit part real,
part imagined. Danish, Norwegian and Swedish are understandable to each
other  with  some effort  and good will  (and English  as  a  reserve  option);
Icelanders tend to master some Scandinavian language, although decreasingly
so; the Finland Swedes constitute one link to Finland, and educated Finns can
mostly communicate in Swedish, but again decreasingly so. These decreases
do not matter much, however, in a discussion of the genesis of the community.
The Protestant culture is shared by all, secularization having made little
difference in this respect; and here, too, it is the situation in the nineteenth
century that is important. National romanticism from the first half of the
nineteenth century involved rediscovering or inventing older national history,
e.g. by going to the Icelandic sagas for inspiration. This meant that much
national mythology, such as the pagan deities and the Viking myths, became
common to Danes, Norwegians and Swedes, making for more of a common
narrative. In both cases, commonality rather than content seems crucial:
Protestant countries in general hardly have a record of being especially
peaceful, and the common myths were rarely tales of peace.
The reconciliation movement created a common ideology, initially called
?Scandinavianism? and much later renamed ?Nordism? (to signify that Finland
had become a ?family member? of equal standing). To someone with Lund
University as alma mater, it is tempting to see the beginning in 1829, when
the great Swedish poet Esaias Tegnér created his Danish colleague Adam
Oehlenschläger doctor honoris causa in the cathedral of Lund, his long poem
including the key lines (in my amateurish translation): ?The time of division is
past / we should not have allowed it to start / in the infinite Kingdom of
Thought?.
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This ideology was initially carried by a movement of academic teachers and
students; it then spread to influence broader middle class groups and finally,
towards the end of the nineteenth century, to encompass working class
organizations, getting intertwined with some of the other reform movements:
trade unions, socialist and liberal parties, cooperative movements, sectarian
churches, the peace and arbitration movement, the abstention movement. It
eventually became one of the factors preventing the Norwegian secession in
1905 from leading to military encounters. If this movement can be seen as a
major reinterpretation of relations, the same is true for another ideology that
was for a long time intertwined with it: neutralism. Swedish neutrality started
as a purely pragmatic policy after 1814; only later did it get an increasingly
principled and programmatic character, thus becoming an ?ism? and remaining
a cornerstone of Swedish foreign policy with a dual anchoring in Realpolitik
and idealism. During the half-century before World War I, neutralism also
grew strong in Denmark and Norway, where it was also intertwined with
Scandinavianism and pacifism. That all three countries managed to stay out of
World War I strengthened the neutralist tradition, and it remained
predomi-nant until World War II; only after that did the Nordic countries
enter different paths as described above, but with the community firmly
established long ago.
Scandinavianism may also have served as a midwife for another structural
tradition of long standing: Nordic NGOs. Whether we speak of trade unions,
scientific associations, sports organisations, etc., there is often a Nordic
association with its recurrent activities intrapolated between the national
ones and the European or global ones they may be associated with. In this
respect too, the early development of civil society with its development of
shared identities preceded ? and promoted ? cooperation at a governmental
level, rather than the other way around, especially if we look at the genesis
period of the community. Yet we should distinguish between ?shared? and
?common? identities. By shared I mean that some elements of identity are
common, whereas others are not. In this respect, the Nordic countries certainly
exhibit shared identities; but this definitely does not mean that all identities
are shared. ?Nordic? has not become a substitute for Danish, Norwegian, etc.
identity; the point is rather that it is compatible with them all and that there
is no conflict between them. The nations are still there and, as the narrow
majorities for or against in all  the Nordic EU referenda may be taken to
demonstrate, many see them as threatened, whether by Europeanisation and
globalisation reducing the protective shell defined by the state ? or by Others
immigrating. In some discourses, it may be interesting to discuss whether the
nations ? and the threats ? are ?real? or ?imagined?; in the present context we
may rather see them as real precisely because of being imagined. It was a
strength that Nordism was never seen as a threat to the single nations and
that Nordic migrants were not seen as Others.
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In lieu of a conclusion
Adler and Barnett trace the failure of Deutsch to get much followers to Realism
being  on  the  up-and-up for  decades  after  World  War  II  ? and Realists
regarding him as too Idealist. My review above seems to point in a different
direction: the Realist elements in the Deutsch tradition make the Nordic
community anomalous, whereas the more Idealist elements fit it far better.
There may therefore be good arguments for seeing the Nordic community as
sui generis, let us call it a ?peace community?, rather than as a species of the
genus ?security community?. It is hardly unique in history ? we are not that
exceptional ? but we should look for other parallel cases than the standard
?security communities? when trying to get a deeper understanding of the
genesis of the Nordic community.
This has some implications for the current debates on the creation of a ?Baltic
Sea security community?. At first glance, we have several bits and pieces
around the Baltic Sea. There is the old Nordic community, here represented
by Denmark, Sweden and Finland, that is (around the Baltic Sea) included in
the EU security community, with Germany added long ago and all others
except Russia in 2004. NATO, to which we may refer as almost a security
community (Turkey and Greece being anyhow far away), complicates the
picture, the new EU members have also joined NATO, whereas the great
opinion poll majorities against membership in Finland and Sweden
(strengthened by recent wars) make them unlikely candidates within the
foreseeable future.
With nine riparian states, there are altogether thirty-six bilateral relations
to consider, many of which have been discussed by scholars in the area (Kiel,
Copenhagen, Uppsala, Tampere, etc.). Six of them are in the old EU-cum-
Nordic security community, sixteen were recently transformed from EU/
non-EU into intra-EU and six from non-EU to intra-EU relationships, leaving
the eight relations with Russia as the only ones left in their own category. No
attempt will be made to go through all these pairs one by one. In the best
cases, we have nascent security communities in some groups of these pairs or
at least prospects for that; in the worst cases, we do not even have that, but
active threat perceptions. Some overall features can be discerned however.
One of them is expressed by the German term ?Einbindung?. Before World
War II, a small state essentially had three options, all of them quite risky, as
history demonstrated: satellite relations to a threatening great power; isolated
neutrality; or joining a great power opposing the one seen as a threat. The
post-war period created a fourth alternative: to make the potentially
threatening great power less so by joining an organisation (EU, NATO, etc.)
where it belonged together with other great powers. This was adopted,
sometimes with enthusiasm, by Germany?s neighbours in the West and, more
important, by Germany itself, no matter what government it had: they all
wished to have Germany tied in by obligations in common organisations, so as
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to remove the fears of Germany ?and German fears ? that had repeatedly
spiralled into European catastrophes.
If the German Einbindung was crucial for the creation of a West European
security community, as can be argued in Deutschian terms, then the obvious
next step towards a wider community would seem to be the Einbindung of
Russia. Yet among the most recent EU/NATO members at the Baltic Sea it is
not easy to see much of such logic: no enthusiasm for Russia joining the EU
and NATO, nor much for organisations where it is a member, such as the
OSCE, the UN or for that matter the Partnership for Peace. This may have
several different reasons. Russian membership in the EU and NATO may be
seen as so unrealistic anyhow that there is no point in rooting for it. It may also
be that the new fourth alternative has not really been discovered yet; at least
in the early years of independence, the debate in the states that are now new
members seemed to continue where it was interrupted in 1939/40, with a
strong emphasis on ?security? in the most traditional sense, whereas the
discourse in their Western neighbours has moved far beyond that,  from
conceptualization of ?security? at one level only (state, usually called ?nation?)
to several levels and from one sector only (the politico-military) to several.
This cleavage is not permanent however, and processes of securitizing or de-
securitizing issues are moving on, creating new opportunities. It also becomes
increasingly clear that there is no permanent ?security? to consider: the
connotation of the term is shifting all the time, depending on the relative
strength of different ?securitizing actors?, as is dramatically illustrated by the
development after 11 September 2001. When traditional politico-military
security thinking initially loomed large in the post-communist states (for
understandable reasons), this created an unusual distribution of roles: Germany,
Russia and the Nordic countries trying to de-securitize military relations in
the Baltic, Poland and the Baltic states pulling in the opposite direction and
therefore seeking security guarantees. Arguments from Western states,
whether NATO or the Nordic neighbours, seem to have persuaded the Baltic
states to mollify their earlier expressions of perceived security threats in their
formulations of doctrines. One of the important things determining how much
of a chance there may be for a future Baltic Sea security community is precisely
how ?security? is conceptualized and by whom.
When relations have been discussed in ?security community? terms, it has to
a large extent also been in Deutschian terms, for example, by looking for a core
state and discussing whether or not Russia could fill that role. For the reasons
mentioned, the other post-communist Baltic states initially did not think
much in ?security community? terms ? and if they did, they would rather look
at EU and/or NATO in a ?core? role, sometimes wishing for Finland and
Sweden to join NATO. Yet notions of a ?Baltic Sea security community? may
fall between two conceptual chairs. One of them is really less ambitious than
Deutsch: trying to make military confrontations as unlikely as possible, using
traditional diplomacy, Confidence Building Measures, etc. along the lines of
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the Helsinki process. And the other one is really more ambitious, being about
a ?peace community?, rather than a ?security community?. In the latter case,
some extension of the Nordic community may be a good conceptual point of
departure ? but then we are looking at small steps, and it may well stop short
of something Pan-Baltic, at least within the foreseeable future. If we look at
the explanatory factors for the Nordic community suggested above, Estonia
would then be closest in these terms: common Protestant culture, relations to
Finnish that are not much more distant than the Scandinavian languages to
each other, centuries of common history with Denmark and later Sweden.
Latvia lies a bit further away (part Protestant, short common history with
Sweden) and Lithuania even further ? and behind them Poland and, at maximal
distance, Russia. And the efforts required to overcome these distances are
rather different from those in the ?security community? tradition ? except for
its Idealist components.
REFERENCES
Adler, Emanuel & Michael Barnett (eds.)(1998) Security Communities. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Deutsch, Karl W. et al. (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area:
International Organization in the light of Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
